[新聞] Vilified abroad,popular at home: China

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1.媒體來源: The Christian Science Monitor (美)基督教科學箴言報 2.記者署名: By Ann Scott Tyson Staff writer 3.完整新聞標題: Vilified abroad, popular at home: China's Communist Party at 100 在國內受到擁護 在國外受到指責 :中共的建黨100周年 4.完整新聞內文: A year ago Feb. 7, China’s brave coronavirus whistleblower Dr. Li Wenliang died after treating patients in Wuhan, triggering an unprecedented online torrent of grief and anti-government rage along with calls for freedom of speech. 一年以前的2月7日,中國勇敢的新冠疫情吹哨者李文亮醫生在照顧病人後去世,在中國網 絡上觸發了空前的哀悼和反政府怒火,要求言論自由。 The widespread public outrage over the government’s initial mishandling of the virus outbreak and suppression of Dr. Li’s warnings amounted to what longtime observers called an existential crisis for China’s Communist Party and Xi Jinping, its leader since 2012. 一些長期的中國觀察家說,公眾對政府起始對疫情的處理不當以及對李醫生發出警告的壓 制的憤怒的蔓延,給中國共產黨和其領導-習近平帶來了自2012年以來最大的危機。 Angry residents brazenly heckled a visiting party Politburo member. Some yelled “it’s all fake” from their apartment windows during the draconian lockdown in Wuhan, the city of 11 million people that is now estimated to have suffered half a million cases and at least 3,800 deaths. 憤怒的居民詰問一位來訪的政治局成員。在武漢封城期間,有一些人從公寓的窗戶內大喊 ,“這都是假的”。武漢這座一千一百萬的城市現在預測有50萬人被感染(血清測試推算 ),至少3800人死亡。 But only five months later in August, with the virus under control, a jam-packed pool party in Wuhan with DJs and dancers in neon tutus was captured in a viral video – a testimony to China’s success in largely quashing the outbreak at home. By January, China’s rapid economic recovery saw the country emerge in many ways stronger from the pandemic year. Its economic output grew by 2.3% in 2020 to become the only major world economy to expand. https://i.imgur.com/avpMVip.jpg
但是,僅僅五個月後的8月份,隨著武漢的疫情被控制住,武漢泳池派對的熱鬧景象在網 上瘋傳——它證明中國基本成功平息了國內疫情。到今年1月,中國經濟迅速復蘇,該國 在許多方面都比疫情肆虐之年要強。中國的經濟在2020年增長了2.3%,是唯一實現增長的 世界主要經濟體。 This stark turnaround has shored up popular support for the party inside China, bolstering the belief of Mr. Xi and other leaders that China’s authoritarian system is resilient and on the rise, despite a sharply negative turn in attitudes toward Beijing in Western democracies. “The best criteria ” for judging a country’s system, said Mr. Xi, sitting with folded hands before a huge mural of the Great Wall in a virtual address to the World Economic Forum Jan. 25, is whether it delivers “political stability, social progress, and better lives.” 這一鮮明轉變增強了民眾對中共的支持,使習近平和其他中國領導人愈發相信,中國的體 制仍富有活力且蒸蒸日上,盡管西方民主國家對中國的態度變得負面。1月25日,習近平 以視訊方式在世界經濟論壇上致辭時說,各國歷史文化和社會制度各有千秋,沒有高低優 劣之分,關鍵在於是否符合本國國情,能否獲得人民擁護和支持,能否帶來政治穩定、社 會進步、民生改善,能否為人類進步事業作出貢獻。 Indeed, as the Communist Party prepares to celebrate its 100th anniversary this summer, experts in China and abroad are delving into why the country’s increasingly autocratic regime enjoys such domestic popular support, especially as Mr. Xi tightens party controls and his own personal grip on power. 事實上,在中共準備今夏慶祝建黨100周年之際,中國國內和國外的專家都在探究中國日 益專制的政體何以在國內如此深得人心,尤其是在習近平收緊了黨的控制力和他自己對大 權的掌控的時候。 “How do you now explain the fact the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] at least appears to be fairly resilient?” says Edward Cunningham, director of Ash Center China Programs at the Harvard Kennedy School. 你現在如何解釋中國共產黨看起來相當富有活力這一事實?”哈佛大學肯尼迪學院阿什民 主治理和創新中心中國項目主任愛德華·坎寧安說。 Overall, popular satisfaction with China’s government has grown stronger over the past 20 years, according to Dr. Cunningham and other Harvard researchers who led an independent, multiyear survey of Chinese public opinion. The 2003 to 2016 study drew on face-to-face interviews with more than 31,000 people in urban and rural China, but did not include most ethnic minorities or migrant workers. In 2016, fully 93% of those surveyed expressed satisfaction with the central government, with 32% saying they were “very satisfied.” That same year, 70% of respondents voiced approval for their local governments, which deliver most public goods and services, marking a significant increase from 44% in 2003. 坎寧安和哈佛大學其他研究人員牽頭開展了一項歷時多年的中國民意調查。他們說,總體 而言,民眾對中國政府的滿意度在過去20年裏提高了。 在2003年至2016年進行的這項研究當面采訪了中國城鄉各地的超過3.1萬人。2016年,93% 的受訪者對中央政府表示滿意,32%的人表示“非常滿意”。同一年,70%的受訪者對地方 政府表示認可。地方政府向民眾交付了大部分的公共產品和服務。在2003年,中國人對地 方政府的滿意度只有44%。 These trends are likely continuing today, says Dr. Cunningham, pointing to anecdotal evidence. “The recent COVID case is a useful example,” he says. “ At the outset, citizens were unhappy with the local government response, but as the central government engaged in lockdowns and the situation improved, satisfaction with central government actions rose, eventually spreading to views of local government as well.” 坎寧安援引各種傳聞指出,這些趨勢在今天可能會持續下去。他說:“最近的新冠疫情是 一個很好的例子。開始時,民眾對地方政府對疫情的響應抱有怨言,但隨著中央政府實施 封城、形勢好轉,人們對中央政府行動的滿意度上升,最終擴大到對地方政府也感到滿意 。” China’s swift curbing of the virus contrasted sharply with bungled responses in the United States and other developed countries, swelling domestic support for the regime, experts say. 專家們說,中國的抗疫果斷行動與美國等發達國家的一團糟局面形成鮮明對比,進一步提 振了國內民眾對中國政府的支持。 “Within China itself, when they apply the lens of China’s response to the virus, both in public health and economic terms and political terms, versus the American management of the virus domestically and many other Western countries, it has further consolidated Xi’s hold on the Chinese leadership, ” says China scholar Kevin Rudd, president of the Asia Society. 在中國內部,當人們聚焦政府是如何處理病毒時,會在公共衛生、經濟增長以及政治方面 ,自然地同美國和其他西方國家國內對疫情的管理進行對比,這種對比更加強化了習近平 對中國的領導力。中國學者Kevin Rudd說到,他是“亞洲社會”的總裁。 Popular satisfaction in China should not be underestimated, says Elizabeth Economy, author of “The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State.” “The vast majority of Chinese feel a lot of pride in how their country has developed economically, and in the greater role China now plays on the global stage,” says Dr. Economy, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University in California. 斯坦福大學胡佛研究所高級研究員伊麗莎白·伊科諾米說,中國的民眾滿意度不容忽視。 她說:“絕大多數中國人對於國家經濟的發展以及中國如今在全球舞臺上發揮的更大作用 感到非常自豪。” Still, the latest developments also shed light on how the country’s authoritarian leadership, even while amassing greater power and control with a high-tech surveillance state, must continue to respond to popular needs, complaints, and pressure. With a population of 1.4 billion, China faces serious demographic, environmental, and economic problems going forward. The party’s often-obscured quest to retain legitimacy drives much of China’s behavior at home and abroad – and could unravel if it doesn’t meet rising expectations. 中國的專制政體必須持續不斷地對來自公眾的需求、抱怨和壓力進行響應。中國有14億人 ,面臨著嚴重的人口結構、環境和經濟難題。中共為了維持自己的統治合法性,必須不斷 的滿足來自民眾日益增長的需求。 “China has politics, too,” says David Lampton, senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. “中國也有政治。”大衛 蘭普頓說。他是約翰霍普金斯高級國際研究學院外國政策學會 的高級研究員。 How this political dynamic evolves in the world’s flagship communist state will have major geopolitical implications for the world over the next decade and beyond. 中國這種政治動機(指中共為了維系執政正當性,需要不斷滿足民眾增長的各項需求)的 演進,將會在未來幾十年內在地緣政治上影響這個世界。 Delivering the goods 交付產品 When A Bo was growing up in a high mountain village in China’s southwestern Yunnan province in the 1970s and ’80s, his family was so poor that they had to eat wild fruit and herbs. One dirt road led to his village, and when heavy summer rains turned it to mud, travel was all but impossible. 上世紀七八十年代,阿波(音)在中國雲南省深山的村子裏長大。因為窮,一家人不得不 吃野果野草。一條土路通往該村,雨後土路一片泥濘,村裏人沒法出門。 “We were always hungry,” he recalls. Today, with government help, Mr. A Bo’ s family and many others in his village have worked themselves out of poverty. He raises ducks, pigs, and cows on a small farm and works at construction and other odd jobs. His village has running water and paved roads. And while his modest income “doesn’t count as very good, it’s a lot better than before,” he says with a laugh. 他回憶說:“我們總是吃不飽肚子。”如今在政府幫助下,阿波一家以及村裏的許多人都 實現了脫貧。他養了鴨子、豬和牛,還在建築工地打零工。村裏有了自來水,修通了柏油 路。他笑著說,他的收入“不算高,但比過去強多了”。 https://i.imgur.com/hZdxUmd.jpg
Courtesy of Matthew Chitwood/File Local villager A Bo (center) joins guests during his daughter’s wedding feast on Dec. 30, 2018, in Liming, China. Beijing’s poverty eradication program has lifted the lives of rural poor people, bolstering support for China’s Communist Party. 上圖中間的人是阿波。這是她女兒在2018年12月份的婚宴。北京的消滅貧困計劃讓很多農 村的窮人改善了生活,讓中共政府獲得了支持。 In December, Mr. Xi announced that China had eradicated extreme poverty in Yunnan and across the country, completing the massive task of lifting 850 million people out of destitution since 1981. The milestone offers one powerful example of how Mr. Xi and the party continue to gain legitimacy for their authoritarian rule in the eyes of China’s people. 2020年12月,中國宣布在雲南乃至全國範圍內消除極端貧困,完成了自1981年以來讓8.5 億人脫貧的艱巨任務。這一裏程碑式事件強有力地說明了習近平和中共是如何在民眾眼中 贏得威信的。 “The government helped us build houses ... and gave us livestock to raise,” says Mr. A Bo. “If we didn’t have their help, we wouldn’t have paved roads or running water, so the common people are relatively happy.” 阿波說:“政府幫我們蓋房子……給我們牲畜飼養。沒有他們幫忙,我們就不會有平整的 馬路和自來水。所以老百姓都挺高興。” As a result, rural people and migrants with lower incomes, such as Mr. A Bo, have been a key source of support for China’s central government, multiple surveys show, constituting essentially an important political base for the party. 多項調查顯示,像阿波這樣收入較低的農村人口和外出務工人員是中國中央政府的主要支 持力量,基本上構成了中共的重要政治基礎。 “There is a very high degree of satisfaction in rural low-income areas for the Chinese Communist Party,” says Matthew Chitwood, a U.S. fellow with the Institute of Current World Affairs, who recently returned from living for two years in Yunnan’s remote mountain village of Bangdong. There, he says, “Xi is the poster child of the party and the poverty eradication campaign.” 當代世界事務研究所的美國研究員馬修·奇特伍德最近剛剛結束了在雲南偏遠山村邦東鄉 的兩年生活,他說:“中國共產黨在農村低收入地區的滿意度非常高,在那些地方,習近 平是共產黨和脫貧攻堅的代表人物。” “My neighbors in Bangdong are living their best lives now,” he says. “ Their lives have dramatically improved from even five years ago, and they attribute that directly to the party.” 他表示:“邦東的鄉親們現在過上了從未有過的好日子,生活與五年前相比顯著改善,他 們把這直接歸功於黨。” Indeed, satisfaction levels since the early 2000s have risen most among China ’s poorer residents like Mr. A Bo, signaling that despite growing inequalities created by economic reforms, marginalized people are not a swelling source of political resentment, the Harvard survey found. “There is still little evidence of a ‘social volcano’ of bottom-up discontent,” says Dr. Cunningham. 哈佛大學的調查發現,自21世紀初以來,像阿波這種中國較貧困居民的滿意度上升幅度最 大。坎寧安說:“至今仍沒有什麽證據表明存在自下而上的社會不滿情緒。” The anti-poverty campaign trumpeted by Mr. Xi is one example of the party’s overarching strategy of “performance legitimacy.” Under Chairman Mao Zedong, the party rallied support around Marxist-Leninist ideology and waging the 1949 revolution. But after Beijing launched market-oriented economic reforms in 1978, the party adopted a more pragmatic strategy to maintain public backing by achieving concrete development goals. 習近平發動的消滅貧困運動是中共“用政績來讓統治獲得合法性”這一重要戰略的實例之 一。在毛澤東的領導下,中共在馬克思-列寧主義這種意識形態下獲得民眾的支持,贏得 了1949年的革命。但是當北京在1978年開始以市場為導向的改革後,中共采取了更現實主 義的戰略來獲取公眾的支持—也就是致力於實現看得見,摸得著的發展目標。 https://i.imgur.com/wp8VJsG.jpg
The Chinese government built new houses in Ganluo County in southwestern China for members of the Yi ethnic minority, who were relocated from their mountain villages as part of an anti-poverty initiative. 中國政府在西南的甘洛縣為少數民族彜族修建的新房子。他們從山上的小村子裏搬到這裏 ,這是消滅貧困計劃的一部分 This performance legitimacy approach is rooted in China’s ancient, dynastic concept of the Mandate of Heaven, which emperors could retain or lose depending on how well they governed, says Dingxin Zhao, dean of the sociology department at Zhejiang University in Hangzhou, China. “這種用政績來讓統治獲得合法性根植於古代中國的天命概念,根據皇帝把國家治理的多 好,他會維系或者失去“天命””,趙鼎鑫,浙江大學社會學系主任,如是說。 Today, the Communist Party works to secure this mandate above all through robust economic growth and “delivering the goods” – from roads to jobs, Dr. Cunningham says. 如今,中共通過強健的經濟增長和向民眾“交付產品”-從修建公路到提供就業機會-來確 保這個所謂的“天命”。坎寧安博士如是說。 The party has also bolstered its rule though social policies aimed at reducing inequalities unleashed by economic reforms. These include rural health care, free education, agricultural subsidies, and poverty alleviation. “Social policy ... has contributed decisively to the regime’s stability and general support of the regime,” says Dr. Zhao. 中共還推行社會政策來減少經濟改革造成的不平等,這其中包括農村醫療、免費教育、農 業補貼和扶貧。趙博士說,這些社會政策對政體的穩定性和政府獲取的支持度有決定性地 貢獻。 Another popular policy has been Mr. Xi’s anti-corruption drive, launched soon after he took charge in 2012. “From the minute he became general secretary of the Communist Party, [Mr. Xi] talked about the need to root out corruption,” which he said “could mean the death of the Communist Party and the death of the Chinese state,” says Dr. Economy. 另一項深得人心的政策是習近平在2012年執政後立即發動的反腐行動。坎寧安博士說,習 近平剛剛成為中共總書記的時候提到,一定要根治腐敗,否則會亡黨亡國。 Rampant official corruption unleashed along with China’s market-oriented economic reforms has stirred deep public discontent. More than half of Chinese surveyed in 2011 described local government officials as “unclean” or “very unclean,” ineffective, and favoring the wealthy, the Harvard survey shows, dismaying villagers such as Mr. A Bo. 隨著中國的市場經濟改革而來的猖獗的腐敗讓公眾極為不滿。在2011年,哈佛大學民調顯 示超過一半的中國人認為地方政府不幹凈,或者非常不幹凈,低效並且偏袒有錢人。 “It was chaotic,” says Mr. A Bo, who recalls corrupt local officials setting up roadblocks and charging tolls, or restricting the water supply. 阿波先生說,那時候很混亂,地方官員設置路障,收取過路費,或者限制水的供應。 Mr. Xi responded with the most sweeping anti-corruption campaign in modern China – arresting thousands of party and government officials of all ranks. Although the campaign was also viewed as part of Mr. Xi’s efforts to purge opponents and consolidate power in his own hands, it sharply curbed official abuses encountered by the public, surveys show. 習近平在現代中國開啟了規模巨大的反腐運動-逮捕了幾千名各種級別的政府官員。盡管 這項運動被一些人認為是為了打擊政治對手和為了自己掌控權利,民調顯示習近平的反腐 運動深得公眾歡迎。 Today, local thugs no longer control roads around Mr. A Bo’s village. “Now those people don’t dare do that ‘underworld’ activity, or they will be arrested,” says Mr. A Bo. “Now it’s peaceful ... and everyone can use the roads.” 如今,地方惡霸不再控制阿波村子周圍的道路。“現在那些人不敢再做哪些黑社會行為, 他們會被抓起來”,阿波說,“現在非常安寧,每個人都可以使用那些道路” Double-edged sword 雙刃劍 Such concrete gains in prosperity and well-being, and progress on problems ranging from corruption to environmental pollution, have boosted the party’s performance legitimacy nationwide – including among China’s new middle class. 這樣的繁榮與民生切實成果以及在從反腐到治汙各方面的進展,增強了共產黨在全國範圍 內的擁護度。包括在中國新的中產階層中的擁護度。 Mr. Zhang, a retired private entrepreneur who was born and raised the son of a factory worker in Beijing, is on the lower rung of this emerging tier. Among the fastest growing in the world, China’s middle class swelled from about 3% of the population in 2000 to more than half, or 700 million people, in 2018. 退休的民營企業家張(音)先生是一名北京工人子弟,它屬於中產階層中比較低階的。中 國擁有世界上最快的經濟增長,中國的中產階級從2000年時的占人口3%,增加到2018年的 占人口一半,也就是7億人。 Mr. Zhang (who asked to withhold his first name to protect his privacy) has benefited not only from China’s economic boom, but from housing security and government spending on his health care and pension. He sums up popular attitudes with a simple story typical of his generation. “When I was small, all we wanted was to be able to fill our stomachs. ... Then, gradually, you could eat well. If you wanted to eat an apple, you could buy an apple. If you wanted to eat meat, you could buy meat,” he says. 張先生不僅受益於中國的經濟增長,而且還受益於住房保障以及政府對他健康保險和退休 金的開支。張先生用他那一代人的典型小故事來概括民眾的態度:“我小的時候,大家只 想著能吃飽肚子……然後,慢慢地,夥食改善了。想吃蘋果就能買蘋果,想吃肉就能買肉 。” In Mr. Zhang’s eyes, steadily rising living standards equate to Beijing doing a good job. “If my life is better day by day, if year by year it’s going in a good direction, then what do I have to be upset about?” he says. 在張先生看來,生活水平的穩步提高等同於中央政府治國有方。他說:“如果我的日子一 天比一天好,一年比一年興旺,那我還有什麽好抱怨的呢?” “Of course,” he adds, Chinese people still complain about things around the dinner table. “Above all, we curse about Chinese officials’ corruption. But what country doesn’t have ‘bad eggs?’” he asks, using Chinese slang for “ scoundrel.” 張先生補充道,“當然,中國人仍然在飯桌上抱怨一些事情。尤其是我們會痛罵中國官員 的腐敗。但哪個國家不會有壞雞蛋呢” Today, such sentiment buoys Mr. Xi politically as the Communist Party nears its July centennial. “By the end of 2020, Xi Jinping had recovered his political position comprehensively,” says Mr. Rudd, the former prime minister of Australia. Mr. Xi is further entrenching his power with the aim of effectively becoming China’s “leader for life” at the next party congress in 2022, he says. 當下,在7月的中共建黨紀念日就要到來時,這樣的情緒算是對習近平在政治上的一個支 持。“在2020年的年尾,習近平徹底恢復了他的政治地位”,澳大利亞前總理陸克文說。 習近平正在進一步鞏固他的權力,為的是在2022年的中共代表大會上,成為終生制的領導 人。 Yet despite the current strength of Mr. Xi and the party, experts point out that performance legitimacy is inherently fragile. It depends upon a continuous, tangible improvement in people’s material well-being. Ever rising expectations create both positive energy and risky tensions – a double-edged sword for the party and its limited resources. “Performance legitimacy relies too much on performance,” says Dr. Zhao. “Your relationship with the people is ... transactional. People judge you ... day by day, case by case.” 盡管習近平和中共目前比較得誌,但專家指出這種“政績帶來的執政合法性”有其脆弱的 一面。它依賴於對人民物質方面的幸福感持續且實實在在的改善。一直增長的期望值創造 了正能量也帶來了風險張力-對中共和它的有限資源來說,這是一把雙刃劍。“政績帶來 的執政合法性”太依賴政績了,趙博士說。“你同人民之間的關系是交易型的,人民一天 天地,一件事情一件事情地來評判你” One major obstacle to raising living standards is the sheer size of the low-income population: 600 million of China’s 1.4 billion people have a per person income of only about $150 a month, according to official data. Although the party has achieved its poverty alleviation target – a very low bar – it now faces the harder task of shrinking the income gap between urban and rural China, and between the coast and hinterland. 一個提高生活水準的主要障礙是規模龐大的低收入人口:6億中國人的人均個人可支配性 收入僅有150美元/月。盡管中共實現了脫貧的目標-這是一個很低的標準-現在它面臨著更 艱巨的任務,也就是縮小中國城鄉間,沿海和內陸之間的收入差距。 “You basically have two different Chinas and two different economies operating,” says Dr. Economy. “So when do you begin to take care of the people who have been left behind?” 伊科諾米說,你基本上有兩個不同的中國和兩個不同的經濟體同時在運作,所以,你何時 開始照顧那些被經濟發展落下的民眾? Beijing knows it will face increased difficulty retaining this performance-based mandate as the population rapidly ages, economic growth continues to slow, and stimulus financing dramatically increases debt. Moreover, China faces rising opposition overseas, where unfavorable public opinion toward Beijing has reached its highest level in 12 years and the lack of confidence in Mr. Xi has surged, according to a Pew Research Center poll of 14 countries with advanced economies in North America, Western Europe, East Asia, and Australia. 北京明白,隨著人口老化,經濟增長放緩和刺激財政政策會增加債務,堅持這種基於政績 的統治合法性會愈加困難。另外依據皮尤調查中心對14個發達國家的民調,這些國家的民 眾對北京的不滿意度達到了12年來的新高,且對習近平的不信任感也上升。 “The party’s leaders believe they have a narrow window of strategic opportunity to strengthen their rule ... before China’s economy sours, before the population grows old, before other countries realize that the party is pursuing national rejuvenation at their expense,” says retired Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, former U.S. national security adviser and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. 中共領導層相信他們有一個很短的戰略機遇期來加強他們的治理…在中國經濟增長放緩之 前,在人口老化之前,在其他國家意識到中共正在以這些國家的利益為代價來追逐自己的 國家復興之前。Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster如是說。他是美國前國安顧問和胡佛中心的高級 研究員。 Rolling back reform 改革倒退 On a sunny October morning in Shanghai, Jack Ma, co-founder of e-commerce giant Alibaba and one of the richest men in China, took to the podium at a global finance summit and made a bold call for innovation of China’s financial system. 在十月上海的某個陽光明媚的上午,阿裏巴巴共同創辦人,也是中國首富的馬雲,在一個 全球金融峰會上大膽地呼籲中國金融系統的創新。 China’s banks exhibit a “severe pawnshop mentality” that hurts entrepreneurship, he said, criticizing the nation’s financial regulators as anachronistic. “We shouldn’t use the way to manage a train station to regulate an airport,” Mr. Ma said. “We cannot regulate the future with yesterday’s means.” 馬雲說,中國的銀行展現了當鋪思想,這傷害了企業家精神。他批評中國的金融監管政策 是過時的。“我們不應該用管理火車站的方法來管理機場”,馬雲說,“我們不能用昨天 的手段來規範明天”。 Soon after, Mr. Ma was reportedly dressed down by regulators and then disappeared mysteriously from public. The highly anticipated initial public offering of Alibaba’s financial technology arm, Ant Group Co., was halted and the firm placed under investigation, reportedly on the orders of China’s top leader Mr. Xi. In January, after missing major appearances, Mr. Ma resurfaced in public for the first time in months in an online video of a small local ceremony. 不久,據報道,馬雲被金融監管機構斥責並且在公眾場合神秘消失了一段時間。螞蟻集團 的IPO被暫停,公司目前被審查,據報道這是習近平的指示。一月份,馬雲在一個視訊會 議中重新回到公眾視線。 The incident demonstrated how, in Mr. Xi’s China, Beijing will not tolerate constructive criticism – even from a top entrepreneur such as Mr. Ma. The imperative of party power and control means subordinating everyone and everything, including top business magnates and their firms. 這個事件證明習近平的中國不會容忍建設性的批評,即便你是一個像馬雲這樣的頂級企業 家。黨的絕對權力和控制意味著所有人和事都要服從,包含哪些頂級企業家和他們的公司 。 Facing uncertain economic growth, China’s post-Mao leaders have looked for alternative ways to secure Communist Party rule into the future. After launching market-oriented economic reforms in 1978, leader Deng Xiaoping and his followers moved to bolster legal sources of legitimacy by strengthening government institutions, promoting a meritocracy, setting standards for a smooth leadership succession, and allowing new avenues for political participation. 面對著不確定的經濟增長,毛澤東之後的領導人尋找一些替代方案來確保中共的統治可以 持續到未來。1978年開始市場經濟導向的改革後,鄧小平和其追隨者通過增強政府制度, 推動菁英管理,設置領導人無縫接班的標準和允許一些新的政治參與途徑來鞏固中共的執 政合法性。 In a 2009 paper, Dr. Zhao warned that moves toward “legal-electoral legitimacy” were vital. Otherwise, Beijing would “face a major crisis when the Chinese economy cools off.” 在2009年的論文裏,趙博士警告說朝著合法選舉的執政正當性走下去是至關重要的。否則 ,當經濟增長慢下來時,北京將會面對很大的危機。 But since 2012, Mr. Xi has moved in the opposite direction. “You had a very dynamic, vibrant political birthing process underway, and for Xi, that was very threatening,” says Dr. Economy. 但是自從2012年,習近平走向了相反的方向。“你有一個有活力的,充滿生機的政治萌芽 過程正在進行中,但是對於習近平來說,那是非常具有威脅性的” ,伊科諾米博士如是 說。 Mr. Xi has rolled back political reforms, strengthened ideological indoctrination and censorship, and tightened party controls. He has concentrated power in his own hands to a degree not seen since Mao – ending term limits and paving the way for his lifelong rule. 習近平讓政治改革倒退,增強了意識形態上的教化和審查,強化了黨的控制力。他現在擁 有了自毛澤東之後最大的權力-結束了任期限制,為自己成為終生領導人鋪平了道路。 Under Mr. Xi, the party has also reined in big companies and curtailed civil society by shuttering nongovernmental organizations. He has jailed activists, from feminists to human rights lawyers, and imposed broad population control measures such as facial recognition surveillance and a social credit system that rates citizens’ behavior. Harsh crackdowns have arbitrarily detained an estimated 1 million Uyghurs and members of other predominantly Muslim ethnic groups in the western region of Xinjiang, while curtailing basic freedoms and purging pro-democracy elected officials, students, and others in Hong Kong. 在習近平的統治下,中共也統治了大公司並通過關閉非政府組織來削弱了公民社會。他把 一些社會活動份子關了起來,通過天網人臉識別系統和社會信用等級系統對廣大的人口進 行控制。在新疆通過嚴厲措施拘禁了一百萬維吾爾人和其他穆斯林少數族裔,並且在香港 剝奪了那些支持民主的民選政務官、學生和其他人的基本的自由。(ilyj2012:這一段完 全是胡說八道) Yet by monopolizing power, Mr. Xi also positions himself as a singular point of blame for any national crisis or setback that can’t be deflected onto local officials. Indeed, Mr. Xi himself is fixated on domestic opinion, prioritizing it over international events, says Steve Orlins, president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, a nonprofit that promotes engagement between the countries. “President Xi gets up in the morning and he ... gets briefings on Tibet, Xinjiang, Chengdu, Wuhan,” he says. “The Chinese view the threats as internal.” “然而因為獨占了大權,習近平讓自己成為任何國家危機或挫折的唯一擔責人。的確,習 近平非常在意國內民眾的看法,而不是國際事務。” 美中關系委員會主席史蒂夫·奧林 如是說,“習近平早上起床後,需要閱讀關於新疆,西藏,程度,武漢的情資簡報,中國 人認為危險來自內部” Ultimately, the increased repression can stifle, but not destroy, pressures from members of China’s increasingly urban, educated, middle class for a greater say in their futures. “Even authoritarian governments have to respond to the elites in their society,” says Mr. Orlins. 基本上,不斷的壓制可以遏制但是不能摧毀城市受過良好教育的中產階級增長的對未來的 更有發言權渴望。中共也不得不響應一些社會精英的需求,奧林如是說。 Discontent over the direction Mr. Xi is moving the country runs deep among some Chinese, from intellectuals and entrepreneurs to migrant workers and activists. Others in China’s creative class feel broader reforms are needed for people to realize their full potential. 從知識分子,企業家到外出打工者和社會活動家,有一些中國人對習近平的治國方向頗有 微詞。另外一些中國的創造性階層認為更廣泛的改革對於讓人們意識到自身的潛力有多大 來說,很有必要。 Tu Guohong lives quietly as an independent artist, writer, and art scholar in Chongqing, a megacity neighboring China’s southwestern Sichuan province. A graduate of an art school, Mr. Tu uses Western-style oil painting to depict working-class Chinese in traditional urban settings. His subject matter is varied, though. He is especially proud of a series of portraits depicting former President Barack Obama as a Chinese peasant. 塗國宏安靜地作為一個獨立藝術家,作家和藝術學者住在重慶。他是藝術學院畢業的,他 用西方的油墨畫來描繪一些傳統鄉村裏的勞工階層。他創作的主題經常變換,但是,他很 自豪自己畫過的一個作品系列,這些作品把美國前總統歐巴馬描繪為一個中國農民。 Asked about his views on the overall level of support for the government, Mr. Tu, who says he doesn’t generally talk about political problems, chooses his words carefully. 當被問及他是怎麽看待社會對政府的支持度時,他說他不想談及政治。 “I don’t know what most people think, but they seek a happy life,” he says. 我不知道大多數人是怎麽想的,但是他們正在尋找一個幸福的生活,他說道。 “As for myself, I want China to follow Deng Xiaoping’s road of reform and opening. Not only economic reform, but also cultural – a nation’s development is not just dependent upon the economy, but also on the humanities,” he says. “China should not go backward.” “對於我個人來說,我希望中國能遵循鄧小平的改革和開放路線。不僅僅是經濟改革,還 應該是文化層面的。一個國家的發展不能僅僅依賴於經濟,還應該依賴於人文”,他說到 ,“中國不應該走回頭路”。 5.完整新聞連結 (或短網址): https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2021/0218/Vilified-abroad-popular-at-home-China-s-Communist-Party-at-100 https://reurl.cc/WEvA6Z 6.備註: 說大陸人民同中共之間的關係是交易型的有些太消極了。實際上絕大部分大陸人已經把中 華民族復興的希望寄托在中共身上了。並不只是為了追求好的生活才支持中共。 --
※ 發信站: 批踢踢實業坊(ptt.cc), 來自: 67.244.24.159 (美國) ※ 文章網址: https://www.ptt.cc/bbs/Gossiping/M.1614141983.A.955.html
1Fagong: 習包子:紅二代 不是爛在床上 就是醉在桌上 沒屁用 02/24 12:48
2Fgn01693664: end 02/24 12:56
※ 編輯: ilyj2012 (67.244.24.159 美國), 02/24/2021 13:28:50

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